From HKFP, a fully illustrated account of how the HK Police spent June 4 in Causeway Bay, apparently setting up a roadblock on a pedestrian-only street…
Another woman was seen gesturing “six” and “four” with her hands at around 6pm on Great George Street in Causeway Bay, The Collective reported. Police officers at the scene warned her that her behaviour could be “seditious”. They pressed her hands down and took her away into a police vehicle.
At around 6.30pm, Chan Po-ying, chairperson of the now-defunct League of Social Democrats, a pro-democracy party, appeared in Causeway Bay with a yellow paper flower.
Police at the scene warned Chan that her behaviour might constitute “disorder in public places” and told her to put the flower in her bag.
Officers then took her away in a police vehicle.
A man was surrounded by police officers on Paterson Street after being spotted holding a candle at around 7pm.
While being searched, he asked whether he was being arrested and said that he did not have to comply with their orders if he was not under arrest. “I know my rights,” he said.
After he asked again whether he was under arrest, an officer said, “Disorderly conduct,” and they escorted him into a police van.
A young man in a black T-shirt was intercepted by police after he put on a blindfold and used a red marker pen to write on his arm outside the Sogo department store at around 7.15pm.
…Before he got into the [police] van, he pulled out a small red book that appeared to be China’s constitution.
Video of another incident here.
Some exquisitely curated weekend reading…
The Guardian on efforts to collect and preserve photos and accounts from Tiananmen in 1989…
The passage of time, with the world’s eyes soon drawn elsewhere, and suppression by authorities at home mean that the pivotal moment in Chinese history is at risk of fading into grey.
…One aspect particular at risk is a detail less commonly associated with the massacre: the hope that blossomed in the days leading up to the killing of hundreds, possibly thousands, of unarmed protesters by the Chinese army as they demanded democratic reforms.
One collection encapsulating that sense is a set of photographs taken by Austrian sinologist Helmut Opletal who was posted to Beijing as a journalist in May 1989. His photographs show crowds of protesters holding up banners calling for freedom and democracy, many with smiles on their faces and thrusting peace signs into the air.
…The Opletal photographs are among the hundreds of items hosted by China Unofficial Archives (CUA), a grassroots project launched in 2023 as a US-registered non-profit that aims to protect “censored and suppressed Chinese history”.
Is Beijing abolishing the hukou? A long read from ezine Positions…
The question of hukou’s demise, however, is as old as China’s capitalist reforms. In 1994, when mass rural-urban migration was only just beginning, South China Morning Post ran the headline “Registration System Set to Be Abolished” (Chan and Buckingham 2008, 583). It wasn’t, but six years later the State Development Planning Commission announced that, “…China aims to abolish the system over the next five years” (Xinhua 2001). Four years after that, The New York Times credulously reported, “China plans to abolish legal distinctions between urban residents and peasants in 11 provinces” (Kahn 2005). In response to this anthology of dashed hopes, misinterpretations, and some bad faith propaganda, Kam Wing Chan and Will Buckingham penned a landmark article in The China Quarterly in 2008 in which they answered definitively: no, the hukou may be changing but it is not going away.
The Diplomat on the mixed messages in Chinese film The Belief. The movie is about the Battle of Peng Hu, a naval engagement in the 1680s (some 40 years after the Manchu conquest), in which a Qing fleet fought and defeated that of the Tungning Kingdom, a Ming-loyalist regime in Taiwan.
To the CCP, the storyline should be obvious: the Mainland seizes Taiwan. But to some nationalistic Chinese, the parallels are less straightforward. The Qing were Manchu invaders who oppressed the Han for centuries up to the 1911 revolution. (As it happens, most combatants on both sides in the Peng Hu battle were Fujianese.)…
The backlash to “The Belief” reflects a strong anti-Qing sentiment in contemporary Chinese society. Where is this mood coming from?
The Qing Dynasty ended over a century ago, making it unlikely that contemporary Chinese people possess a deep collective memory of living under Qing rule. Furthermore, the Manchus in China today have been highly assimilated by the Han Chinese, and their language has almost become extinct. This means that a serious cultural conflict between the Han Chinese and Manchus is also unlikely. These factors make this question particularly perplexing.
…contrast the reception of “The Belief” with the surge in popularity of palace dramas and romance dramas set in the Qing Dynasty in mainland China during the 2010s. Some of these dramas achieved extremely high ratings during this period.
However, in recent years, films and television series set in this dynasty have faced more severe questioning and criticism regarding their political and nationalist implications. This represents a new wave of Han chauvinism, which has clashed with official discourse.
Under the Han chauvinistic narrative that has gained strength in recent years, the Qing Dynasty is often seen as a dark age for the Han people, bringing entirely negative consequences to Chinese history. This dynasty is frequently associated with massacres, national humiliation, monarchical autocracy, and cultural control.
…the Manchus … did enjoy certain privileges during their rule. These privileges have led to a deliberate distinction between the Manchus and Han Chinese in today’s sentiment, equating the Manchus with the “ruling class” and portraying them as “oppressors” of the Han. This reminds people of the rigid class system in today’s Chinese society. Viewed through this lens, the rise in anti-Qing sentiment is essentially a collective historical imagination, used to provide catharsis for contemporary Chinese dissatisfaction with reality.
From Semafor, a look at how Beijing has created the enemy it sees in Japan…
Japan-bashing has become the core of a strident Chinese nationalism, with disastrous consequences. Indeed, Beijing’s nonstop demonization, economic coercion, and regular harassment of Japan, its people, and its institutions have created the monster it most fears.
More than you could possibly want to know about Beijing indie band (and today’s guest stars) Carsick Cars.











